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Abstract 
We study and compare the impact of tax indicators, described by Paying Taxes 
scores of Doing Business report, on two modes of FDI in equity capital- greenfield 
FDI and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Then, we apply 25 percent 
improvement to each tax factor and evaluate this effect on inbound flow of FDI 
determinants. The study compares four methods-the ordinary least squares, 
random-effects, fixed-effects, and Hausman-Taylor models- applied to the panel 
data for one hundred sixty countries for the period from 2009 to 2017. The 
consummate range of Hausman-Taylor tools when applied to studies of panel 
datasets with time-varying, time-invariant and endogenous parameters of tax 
administration reveals the divergence among the factors appealing to M&A and 
greenfield investors. The study assesses the higher sensitivity of M&A to the factors 
of economic development, overall business friendliness and location of a potential 
host economy. The countries at the lower end of GDP per capita performance are 
more likely to attract foreign direct investments, if the message about the domestic 
reforms in tax regulations and administration targets greenfield investors. 
Keywords: foreign direct investments (FDI), greenfield FDI, cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), tax administration, tax regulations, 
Hausman-Taylor method 













The existing literature contains comparatively limited volume of papers studying the 
effective performance of tax administration and regulation as a tool for enhancement of foreign 
direct investments (FDI) inflows to destination (host) economies as well as contemplating this 
relation from the perspective of new investments in equity capital, particularly cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and greenfield investments. Meanwhile, the debate concerning 
the depth of reforms to reevaluate tax regulation and administration in exchange for possibilities 
of substantial increases in foreign direct investments has become essential in developing and 
transition economies because many of these countries view FDIs as the main path in achieving 
economic development (Mencinger, 2003; Wang and Wong, 2009).  
The objective of this analysis is to investigate the nexus between the determinants of tax 
regulation and administration, quantitatively evaluated and ranked by the Doing Business report, 
and inflows of foreign direct investments (World Bank, 2018; UNCTAD, 2018). The study also 
compares the divergence in the set of fiscal factors in terms of appeal to the M&A versus 
greenfield investments. While the Doing Business reports are available throughout 2019, and 
paying taxes topic of this report is available from 2004 onward, we choose the reports for the 
period from 2009 to 2017, corresponding with the current span of economic recovery and the 
latest available data on FDI. This study focuses on 160 economies.  
First, this work investigates the effects of tax regulation and administration practices on 
FDI inflows. In general, FDI inflows consist of three main components: equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings and intercompany debt (OECD, 2016). Then, the paper studies the same 
effects on two components of equity capital: greenfield investments and M&A. The countries, in 




diversifying domestic operations and enhancing the skills of domestic labor force, regard 
greenfield investments more favorably, due to the latter’s business concept of building the 
operations from ground up as a new enterprise. The M&A transactions are usually conducted in 
the form of the parent company taking over or investing in some form of purchase of a business 
entity in a host economy usually accompanied by the change of management and/or operations 
of acquired firm (Blonigen and Slaughter, 2001; Wang and Wong, 2009).  
The Hausman-Taylor model (HTM) along with random-effects, fixed-effects and 
ordinary least square methodologies is applied and the comparison of utilized methodologies 
determines advantages of HTM for studies of panel datasets with combination of time-varying, 
time-invariant and endogenous factors as explanatory variables. The latter methodology is also 
used for evaluating the impact of a hypothetical assumption of 25-percent improvement in each 
of the studied tax measurements on the FDI determinants. 
The contribution of this study is significant in the following ways. A comparative study 
of M&A and greenfield investments determined through tax indicators is a fresh angle for a 
sought-after topic of FDI. The strategy of choosing tax performance determinants with estimated 
low multicollinearity coefficients has made this study possible. This paper puts forward a new 
perspective that the multinationals, when making decisions about inbound FDIs, respond more 
favorably to the potential host economies, which implement relevant reforms of tax 
administration, than the ones, which offer tax reductions.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review of the literature. 
Section 3 discusses the data used in the study. In Section 4, an empirical model with the 
econometric strategy is presented. Section 5 offers discussion of the main results, and Section 6 




2. Literature Review 
 The vast economic literature studying the effects of FDI on the economies of host 
countries, particularly of developing or transition economies, suggests that foreign direct 
investments are viewed as an essential factor in the enhancement of economic development 
(Mencinger, 2003; Wang and Wong, 2009). The reports from international organizations, OECD 
and World Bank, also highlight the notion of developing countries to consider FDI as the 
primary source of economic growth and modernization (OECD, 2002; Klein et al., 2001). 
Therefore, the governments of these countries, being ready for negotiations, may encumber 
significant costs by lowering tax rates or relaxing regulatory standards associated with the 
attraction of new investments. The described practice is known as tax competitions and 
sometimes referred as “the race to the bottom” (Carkovic and Levine, 2002; Ford et al., 2008; 
Olney, 2013; Hanson, 2001).  
 Two main groups of thought can be defined when summarizing the literature on the 
relation of tax determinants and inbound FDIs flows. On the one hand, a vast literature studies 
the impact of tax ratios on FDIs and assesses a reverse relation between the changes in tax ratios 
and FDI inflows, where a reduction in tax rate, particularly of corporate income tax, may 
increase the inbound FDI (Bellak and Leibrecht, 2009; Devereux et al., 2008). Herein, Becker et 
al. (2012) measure the effects of changes in corporate tax on the quality and quantity of foreign 
direct investments. Their study of twenty-two European countries concludes that the 
governments should vigilantly consider not only the level of FDI inflow, but also the qualitative 





 On the other hand, a smaller group studies the topics closely associated with the specifics 
of tax administration and its complexity (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009; Lawless, 2011; Martinez-
Vazquez and Vulovic, 2011; Goodspeed et al., 2011). Lawless in 2011 analyzes the relation of 
FDI and tax systems by means of bilateral FDI relations between sixteen OECD FDI source 
countries and fifty-seven host economies and finds that tax complexity does not have strong 
implications on the level of FDI inflow. Her study also estimates that 10 percent reduction in tax 
complexity corresponds with the tax reduction by 1 percentage point.  
3.  Data  
3.1 Independent variables  
 3.1.a Tax determinants  
 This discussion first addresses the independent variables followed by dependent variables 
used in the study. The control variables measuring different aspects of effective tax performance 
are adopted from the Paying taxes topic of the Doing Business ranking. The Doing Business 
report, produced as a collaboration of the World Bank and PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers), is an 
unprecedented statistical tool for comparison of economies through a range of business related 
indicators estimated on yearly basis. It consists of ten main indicators of public sector 
performance, comprised of forty-one subgroups, and describes performance of 190 economies.  
 From the Doing Business report we choose three variables of effective tax rates that 
would typically be considered as determinants of tax regulation (CIT, labor tax and 
contributions, and other taxes) and five variables representing various aspects of tax 
administration (annual number of payments, time to complete tax returns, time to obtain VAT 




Business methodology the aforementioned factors represent typical conditions for medium-sized 
enterprises operating in a given economy at the second year of operations. For instance, the 
official statistics from Small Business Administration (2018) suggests that in the United States 
only about 79 percent of new businesses survive first year of launching and approximately 50 
percent of firms fail at the fifth year of operations. Thus, the odds of first-year business survival 
in developing and transition economies would arguably be much lower due to more moderate 
business sustainable infrastructures. In addition, Tomson and Spinelli (2009) address the concept 
of “the liability of newness and liability of smallness” of the business launching stage, which 
also integrates learning curve of business related operations, including paying taxes and 
complying with tax bureaucracy. With this consideration of the U-shape business life-cycle 
combined with the common notion of governments to provide short-term incentives in the 
launching stage and to impose more complex compliance rules for large enterprises, we feel 
comfortable using Doing Business data of enterprises operating at the second year of operations, 
since it would be representative of the small and medium-sized enterprises at their comparatively 
steady stage of operations. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the research is 
compiled in Table 1. 
 All tax variables represent effective tax rates (not statutory) calculated as a ratio of the 
cost of an individual tax to the commercial profit (World Bank, 2018; Djankov et al., 2010). In 
regard to some outliers in the data set, the min [−0.2] in profit tax rate (% of profit) for France 
in 2016 is due to the method of estimation in the data source. The ratio of other taxes as % of 
profit exceeding 100% is linked with the following countries: Argentina for the period of 2015-
2016, Burundi 2009-2011, Central African Republic 2009-2011, Comoros 2009-2017, 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Units Mean S.D.  Min Max Source 
Dependent Variables 














GreenfieId FDI  
USD 
million  
4,685.67 11,139.01 0 108,940.70 
Independent Variables 
Tax Determinants 











278.07 246.49 12 2600 
Corporate Income Tax  (CIT)  % of profit 16.01 9.38 -0.2 58.9 
Labor Tax & Contributions  % of profit 17.61 11.44 0 68 
Other taxes  % of profit 12.13 33.52 0 272.3 
Time to obtain VAT refund  Weeks 48.36 39.48 0 100 
Cases for CIT audit  
Quartile of 
cases 
2.6 0.95 0 4 
Time to comply with CIT audit   
Hours per 
year 
13.11 16.68 0 96 
Other Control Variables 
Ease of doing business  Score  59.81 13.12 22.49 90.87 
Regions  Range  9.06 5.51 1 18 UNCTAD 
GDP per capita   
USD 
million 
13,705.26 18,899.16 213.41 108,600.90 WDI & WITS  
Number of observations 1,440 Number of groups  160     
  
 In order to get a more balanced dataset, the score for the explanatory variable time (in 
weeks) to obtain VAT refund is merged with two other measures provided in the Paying Taxes 




measuring VAT refund process per each case. Basically, these three variables are logically 
combined, assigning to the cases with VAT and no refund practices the highest value of 100 
assuming the most unfavorable terms for FDI. The cases with no VAT and no refund practices 
receive a 0 score, therefore assuming the most favorable conditions for FDI. Before these 
modifications, the score for the variable ranged [2.2; 90] weeks, with lower scores describing 
better VAT refund practices with the lowest in Sri Lanka. The countries with no VAT practices 
and, therefore, assigned 0 score include Angola, Bahrain, Bhutan, Comoros, Eritrea, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Liberia, Oman, Qatar, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, the United 
Arab Emirates and the United States.  
    The variable defining CIT administration performance, the percentage of cases exposed 
to a corporate income tax audit (%), is also modified to a more useful format for the current 
model. Thus, the indicator is reported as a quartile with the lowest surveillance practices being in 
[0%; 24%] quartile and the highest ones in [75%; 100%] quartile, creating four indices. Since, 
there are also countries that do not levy CIT, such as the Bahamas, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates, a score 0 is assigned to this countries summarizing the most favorable 
CIT practices (no tax) for FDI. Overall this variable takes the values in the range [0; 4].  
  The factor of the time to comply with a corporate income tax audit is slightly modified by 
adding a score 0 assigned to the aforementioned countries which do not levy CIT.  
 3.1.b Other control variables 
 The existing literature finds the level of institutional development and government 
infrastructure, particularly of legal institutions in securing property rights and intellectual 
property, being determinants for FDI inflows (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). We use the ease 




environment of an economy. This variable is extracted from the Doing Business report where 
higher scores correspond with more business friendly conditions. This indicator captures a set of 
ten characteristics necessary to conduct business, including starting a business, registering 
property, getting credit, protecting minority rights, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency, and 
other. The lack of data for earlier periods is compensated by a small modification of replacing 
the missing information with the last available value for a case.   
 The literature suggests that one of the most popular explanatory variables of a country’s 
propensity to attract FDI, specifically for studies of developing countries, is the size of its 
economy, such as GDP, population, GDP per capita, and GDP growth (Wheeler and Moody, 
1992; Taylor, 2000; Nunnenkamp, 2002; Hansen and Rand, 2006). In this analysis we use 
annual GDP per capita in the US dollars and constant prices of 2010 retrieved from the World 
Development Indicators and World Integrated Trade Solutions databases, both published by the 
World Bank.  
 The control variable Regions follows the classification of economies used by the 
UNCTAD report (Table 2). This variable is used to control for the regional effect and, in the 
current case, is comprised of 18 distinct regions. 
3.2 Dependent variables 
 This study focuses on three dependent variables which determine the levels of annual 
FDI in a host economy. We start with the FDI inflows, which, according to OECD (2016), 
consist of three main components, including equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and 
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equity capital- cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and greenfield FDI. The 
UNCTAD online database is used as a source for compiling the data on all three dependent 
variables for the period from 2009 to 2017, corresponding with the start of the current economic 
cycle and the latest available data on FDI. All FDI related variables that are equal to zero are 
treated as valid cases, owing to the assumption and further testing the concept that poorly 
performing tax systems may negatively impact MNEs’ (multinational enterprises) decisions to 
invest and, therefore, not generate FDI. Following the existing studies of the nexus between FDI 
and GDP, current analysis uses logarithmic values applied to all determinants of FDI and GDP 
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Gao, 2005).  
 Since the main intention of this analysis is to define the impact of a tax performance 
determinant, while others being controlled, on the decision of MNEs to proceed with investments 
in host economies, we conduct VIF test to assess the threat of multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables (after the OLS being applied). According to the literature, the estimates for 
considered variables are within the acceptable range and no threat of multicollinearity is detected 
(Hair et al., 2010) (Table 3).  
Table 3. VIF test for multicollinearity of control variables 
Variable VIF* 1/VIF 
Ease of doing business 3.29 0.303757 
lnGDP 2.96 0.337308 
Payments 1.69 0.592214 
Time to comply with CIT audit 1.62 0.617660 
Cases for CIT audit 1.62 0.618489 
Time to obtain VAT refund 1.60 0.626075 
Labor tax & contributions rate 1.43 0.700092 
Time 1.34 0.746032 
Regions 1.26 0.794200 
Other taxes 1.20 0.831408 
Profit tax 1.19 0.841259 
Mean VIF 1.75  
*VIF-variance inflation factor test for multicollinearity, for 𝑉𝐼𝐹𝑠 ∈ [1; 5] suggesting 




Similarly, Pearson correlation matrix assesses the usefulness of this set of tax performance 
determinants for proceeding with the methodology (Table 4). 
 




This section describes the empirical strategy used to evaluate the impact of the 
determinants of tax performance discussed in the previous section on variables measuring FDI 
inflows, M&A and greenfield investments. The following models- OLS, Fixed-effects, Random-
effects and Hausman-Taylor- are applied and compared in terms of effectiveness of built-in tools 
necessary for the examined dataset.  
The OLS regression is given by Eq. (1).  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       [1] 
Where,  
𝑌𝑖𝑡-  value of one of inbound FDI variables, such as logarithmic values of 
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝑀&𝐴 𝑖𝑡, and 𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡  
𝑋𝑖𝑡-  vector of time-variant parameters  
 lnGDPpercap     0.7797  -0.5522  -0.2175  -0.1448   0.1831  -0.2979  -0.4637  -0.2740  -0.1896  -0.2529   1.0000
     Regions    -0.2237   0.2537   0.1542   0.0367  -0.2453  -0.0009   0.2748   0.0551   0.0986   1.0000
Timetocomp~t    -0.2496   0.0861   0.1964   0.0194  -0.0402   0.0247   0.1091   0.5728   1.0000
casesforCI~t    -0.2200   0.1065   0.1026   0.1411  -0.0741   0.1102   0.1037   1.0000
Timetoobta~d    -0.4677   0.3648   0.3904   0.0860   0.1199   0.2053   1.0000
  Othertaxes    -0.3491   0.1804   0.0879  -0.0341  -0.0977   1.0000
Labortaxan~s     0.0911  -0.0482   0.2242  -0.3095   1.0000
   Profittax    -0.0803   0.0432   0.0398   1.0000
        Time    -0.3185   0.2258   1.0000
    Payments    -0.6083   1.0000
Easeofdoin~b     1.0000
                                                                                                                 




𝑍𝑖𝑡-  vector of time-invariant parameters  
𝛼0, 𝛽
′, 𝛾′- constant and vectors of coefficients of the estimation 
𝜀𝑖𝑡-  error term of the estimation, with the expected value of zero  
𝑖-  id of a country, i = 1, …, 160  
𝑡-  time period, t=1, 2, …, 9. 
 The same model in Fixed-effects scenario is described in Eq. (2), where all time-invariant 
parameters are dropped due to specifics of this approach:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       [2] 
 The Random-effects model is estimated by Eq. (3) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑍𝑖 + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖)       [3] 
𝑍𝑖-  general term representing time-invariant explanatory variables used in the model. 
The following control variables are time-invariant: Regions, % of cases for CIT audit, time to 
comply with CIT audit, and time to obtain VAT refund.  
𝑋𝑖𝑡-  general term representing time varying parameters, including GDP per capita and 
the variables retrieved from the Doing Business report and not listed among 𝑍𝑖 variables above.  
𝑢𝑖-  uncorrelated with other independent variables error term.  
 It should be noted that the composite error term (𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) allows assessment of 
variation at both levels “micro” and “macro” and is reported as between and within errors, 
respectively. Additionally, if we use a term 𝑦𝑖𝑡 as a general interpretation for all independent 
variables in equation [1], then 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑖)= 0 , where 𝑡 = 1,2 … , 9 and 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 160. In 
other words, the unobserved effect 𝑢𝑖 is uncorrelated with all other independent variables. Since 




systems, the GLS transformation of the RE model, while eliminating the serial correlation in the 
errors, allows observation of explanatory variables that are constant over time.    
 The Hausman-Taylor method can be considered as an extension to the Random-effects 
model, which also combines characteristics of Instrumental Variables (IV) methodology. 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) find that the explanatory variables of 𝑋2 type described below may 
cause bias in Random-effects estimator and suggest a model, which, if instrumented in 
correspondence with their proposed structure, would resolve the issue. This test distinguishes and 
allows to obtain corresponding coefficients for datasets, which include endogenous and time-
invariant variables. Following the Hausman-Taylor assumption and adjusting it to our case Eq. 
(3) takes the following form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽′1𝑋1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽
′
2
𝑋2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾′1𝑍1𝑖 + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖)       [4] 
Where the explanatory variables are grouped as:  
 𝑋1𝑖𝑡-  time-variant variables uncorrelated with 𝑢𝑖 
𝑋2𝑖𝑡-  time-variant variables correlated with 𝑢𝑖  
𝑍1𝑖 -  time-invariant variables uncorrelated with 𝑢𝑖 
With the assumption that E(𝑢𝑖 | 𝑋1𝑖𝑡,𝑍1𝑖𝑡) =0 but E(𝑢𝑖 | 𝑋2𝑖𝑡,) ≠0 
With consideration of the correlation matrix presented in Table 4 the variables of GDP 
per capita and Payments are modelled as 𝑋2𝑖𝑡 variable, since their correlation coefficient with 
other independent variables exceeds 0.5. Variables Regions, % of cases for CIT audit, time to 
comply with CIT audit, and time to obtain VAT refund are modelled as 𝑍1𝑖𝑡 variables. All other 




After conducting all tests we predict the standard errors, use it for comparison of the 
estimators’ econometric properties and assess the usefulness of Huausman-Taylor methodology 














This section consists of two subsections. First, the discussion provides a comparative 
assessment of each method and elaborates on the research outcomes. Second, following the 
widely accepted notion of government administrators, in which relaxed tax regulations, 
specifically lower tax rates, are viewed as a tool for attracting inbound FDIs, we proceed with the 
postestimation tests where one of the tax performance determinants is hypothetically assumed at 
more favorable for investments level, while others are kept unchanged; this new outcome is 
compared with the base case. The output of the Hausman-Taylor test for three types of inbound 
FDI flows outlined in Table 5 is used as the base case and the same method with actual, not 
logarithmic, values is used in postestimation tests (Table 6).  
5.1 Discussion of estimates 
The results of the analysis (Table 5) outline the divergence between tax determinants for 
attracting M&As and greenfield investments to potential host economies. Thus, M&As have less 
sensitivity to tax determinants or domestic reforms, focused on improvement of these factors, 
and more attuned to the overall economic development and location of the host economy. On the 
contrary, greenfield investors are strongly susceptible to both tax regulation and tax 
administration factors, to a lesser degree responsive to economic development and not sensitive 
to the location of a potential host economy. 
Taking into consideration the business concepts of M&A versus greenfield investments, 
makes the perceived conservatism of M&As towards particular countries to invest (higher 
economic development, particular regions, business friendly conditions) more clear, since the 




possibilities of either mergers or business takeovers/acquisitions of some type. Thus, roughly 70 
percent of all M&A transactions are conducted in the North America region. In the meantime, 
greenfield investments is a more mobile type of foreign capital that focuses on the country-
specific parameters, including business and tax environments, and not on the location or, to some 
extent, national income. Therefore, the analysis assesses a wider range of regions attractive for 
greenfield investments, including East Asia and North America with 29 percent shares each, 
South-East Asia (10 percent), as well as Other Developed Europe and South Asia with 5 percent 
shares each. Furthermore, all regions, except for Central Africa and Caribbean, have obtained at 
least 1 percent of greenfield investments. 
Overall, the M&A transactions slowed down by approximately 20 percent in 2017, 
including over 40 percent decline in Europe. Only a handful of countries report positive trend, 
including China (particularly Hong-Kong), Israel, Mauritius, Singapore, India, and Russian 
Federation. Greenfield investments also experienced about 13 percent decline in 2017 and the 
largest share of this reduction is attributable to developing economies, since the trend for 
developed economies was upward. Apart from this statistics, several developing economies 
experienced significant increase in greenfield investments, including Cameroon, Kenya, 
Namibia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Singapore, Serbia, Russian Federation, 
Georgia and Ukraine. 
Thus, according to the global scale simulation addressing three types of FDIs, the tax 
regulation and administration practices may serve as viable public policy tools for attracting 
investments (Table 5). Overall, due to the structure of FDI inflows, combining equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings and intercompany debt, in which the component of equity capital is the 




matching characteristics of both types of FDIs in equity capital seem natural. The countries with 
overall better conditions for doing business and higher GDP per capita have higher chances for 
attracting FDI inflows. In addition labor tax and contribution rates also have positive 
implications for FDI inflows.  
The comparative analysis of FDI in cross-border M&A and greenfield investments 
reveals that M&A are sensitive to the overall development of an economy (GDP per capita), its 
good practices for supporting business (ease of doing business), and location (regions) and less 
sensitive to tax determinants. Thus, of all tax determinants, only the number of payments per 
year (Payments) has a significant impact on M&A with positive coefficient, assuming that both 
variables move in the same direction. Overall, due to the nature of this analysis the results 
capture the global trend of a determinant. However, in order to better communicate the outcome, 
three groups of economies should be kept in mind. The positive relation is due to two following 
types of economies. First, in many countries the earlier periods with higher number of payments 
are also characterized by higher volume of M&A inflow, e.g. Bahrain, Belarus, Russia, 
Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Ukraine, etc. Second, in countries, such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Colombia, Croatia, Estonia, Nigeria, Qatar, the US, etc., the number of payments 
have increased over time matching the same upward trend for M&As. Overall, the countries 
representing the second case scenario tend to represent the lower bounds of Payments 
determinant [< 15] (Colombia, Estonia, and the US). Third, it should be noted that the spread of 
this determinant is large [3; 147] and, over the course of analysis, the economies at higher 
bounds [40; 147], such as Armenia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, India, Kyrgyz Republic, 




significant reduction of this number, frequently corresponding with the higher M&A inflow (e.g. 
Ukraine improved this determinant from 147 in 2009 to 5 in 2017).  
  Greenfield investments are more sensitive to the changes in tax determinants. Thus, the 
Hausman-Taylor test results indicate that greenfield investments are responsive to the changes in 
annual time spent on preparation of tax returns (Time), labor tax and contribution effective rate, 
as well as non-tax related determinants of ease of doing business and GDP per capita. Similar to 
the case in which Payments determinant has a positive effect on M&A investments, Time has a 
significant positive impact on greenfield investments. In general, the interpretation of the analysis 
outcome should be considered through three main groups of countries, where first two groups 
contribute in the direct relation. First, in countries, such as Azerbaijan, Belgium, Botswana, 
Canada, Ethiopia, France, Ireland, etc., the determinant of Time grows over time and this positive 
trend is in line with the increase in inbound greenfield investments. Second, the economies of 
Estonia, Japan, and Mauritius are characterized by combination of higher determinant of Time 
and higher volume of greenfield FDI inflow in earlier periods and both indicators decline over 
the course of analysis. Third, the very large range [12; 2600] of this factor is due to the outlying 
[> 600] performance of few economies, including Bolivia 2009-2017; Brazil 2009-2017; 
Cameroon (2009-2017); Chad (2009-2017); Congo, Rep. (2009- 2017); Ecuador (2011-2017); 
Mauritania (2009-2016); Senegal (2009-2016); Ukraine (2009-2012); Venezuela, RB (2009-
2017). Based on the statistics, almost all countries (except for Brazil) with unusually high 
numbers corresponding with inefficient performance of Time have substantially improved tax 
administration efforts leading to considerable reduction of this measure and higher inflow of 




     The measure of labor tax and contributions effective rate has a positive coefficient in relation 
with greenfield FDI. While this measure captures the range of [0; 68], there is only a handful of 
countries with the tax rate exceeding 40 percent, including Belgium, 2009-2017; Brazil, 2009-
2015; China, 2009-2017; France, 2009-201; Italy, 2009-2017; and Ukraine, 2009-2016. In 
despite to being in the upper bound of the range, in France, Italy, Brazil and Ukraine this 
measure has been constant or moving upward, while also maintaining high levels of greenfield 
investment inflows, which is unlike other discussed indicators.  
Overall, when discussing the positive relation between labor tax and contributions 
effective rate and greenfield investments the following four groups of countries should be 
considered. The first and larger group of countries represents the case, in which both, the tax rate 
and investment flow, have growing trends (e.g. Bolivia, 2013; France, 2015; Kyrgyz Republic, 
2011; Pakistan, 2012; Slovenia, 2011; Spain, 2012; United Kingdom, 2011). The second group 
of countries is characterized by negative trend for both the labor tax and contributions effective 
rate and greenfield investments (e.g. Burkina Faso, 2012; Indonesia, 2016; Kenya, 2014; Poland, 
2010; Rwanda, 2010, 2012; Turkey, 2010, 2012; Uzbekistan, 2017). In addition to the countries 
with no labor tax and contributions obligations (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Botswana, Comoros, 
Eritrea, Lesotho and Suriname), the third group also includes the ones, where the rate has stayed 
unchanged corresponding, mainly, with growing volume of greenfield investments (e.g. Angola, 
Cameroon, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Grenada, Haiti, Iran, Iraq). 
Lastly, the forth group represents the case of reverse effect, where an increase/decrease in the tax 
rate leads to significant decrease/increase of greenfield investments (e.g. China, 2010-2011; 




Table 5. Comparative results for global scale simulations by types of FDI and applied methods 
  Dependent Variables 
 Independent 
Variables 
lnFDI inflow lnFDI M&A lnFDI GF 
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 Note: #observations =1,440; #groups by countries (except OLS)=160; t=9;  














In general, the nature of labor tax and contributions indicator is somewhat more 
complex, as it is not merely a tax revenue mobilization tool, but, partly, a redistribution 
mechanism of current earnings to retirement savings to be spent in the future, therefore it could 
have positive implications for state budgets both in short and long-term perspectives. To some 
extent, the positive relation of labor tax and contributions effective rate and greenfield 
investments can be explained by the business concept of greenfield investments. These 
companies, building their enterprises from ground-up as long-term ventures in host economies, 
may view the option of offering higher retirement contributions as an incentive included in the 
benefits package of employment agreements. Thus, setting up higher rates would give these 
companies competitive advantage of attracting the best talent pool available in a given economy, 
and shape positive attitude towards higher rates of this tax.  
5.2 Comparison of FDIs estimates with improved tax determinants 
In this section we proceed with the task of setting a hypothetical improvement in a tax 
determinant from the potential FDI perspective, while other tax factors are kept unchanged, and 
evaluate the impact of this change on the FDI inflows. In the majority of cases, an improvement 
is assumed to be a reduction by 25 percent from the original value expressed by 𝑋?̂? = 𝑋𝑖 − 0.25𝑋𝑖. 
The effective tax rate for three considered taxes is reduced by 5 percent, expressed by 𝑋?̂? = 𝑋𝑖 −
5, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 > 5 & = 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 5 , where the original tax rate below 5 percent takes value = 0 in the 
new estimation. The effective tax rates reduction by 5 percent is roughly comparable with our 
assumption of improvement of tax administration determinants by 25 percent, also allowing for 
comparison among three taxes. Two different approaches are taken for the determinant of the 
cases for CIT audit, since according to the previous literature the foreign investors targeting 




investments (Sedrakyan, 2018). Since this variable takes five following values[0; 4] and due to 
its nature described in Chapter 3, the change = 1 corresponding with 20 percent improvement in 
this indicator is used and the analysis tests two scenarios. In the first case scenario 𝑋?̂? = 𝑋𝑖 −
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 > 0 & = 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 = 0 , and in the second case 𝑋?̂? = 𝑋𝑖 + 1, 𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑋𝑖 < 4 &  = 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 =
0 & = 4, if 𝑋𝑖 = 4.  
We also evaluate the impact of the ease of doing business. Since the best performance is 
assessed for Singapore at maximum level of 90.87 (2011, 2012), a hypothetical improvement of 
10 percent for all economies with the performance score below 81 is applied, while keeping this 
score unchanged for all economies above the threshold. This strategy allows for setting up an 
improvement and not a simple scaling up of the indicator (Table 6).  
As it was expected, the strongest impact is assessed through a positive change in the ease 
of doing business indicator. While the tests (Table 5) have estimated significant positive impact 
of this indicator on all three types of FDI, the analysis of 10 percent improved measure shows 
that the strongest impact is seen in the case of M&A with 74.29 percent increase from the 
original volume of investments.  
Among tax determinants the strongest implications are assessed when the cases for CIT 
audit are increased by 1 quartile, meaning that, for instance, if an economy on average used to 
conduct CIT surveillance in the range of 25-50 percent of all CIT cases (quartile 2), the increase 
to 50-75 percent (quartile 3) will strongly improve both M&A and greenfield investments. These 
results can be explained, if considered that the investors prefer to eliminate more severe financial 
risks in the long-term perspective, therefore advocating for short-term control measures. 
Interestingly, a reduction in the time to comply with CIT audit corresponds with the 




CIT surveillance conducted annually eliminates the odds of making significant mistakes and thus 
reduces the time to comply with audit. 
Table 6. Comparison of estimates with tax improvements 
Variable 
 𝑋?̂? 
Treatment Measure FDI inflow M&A  
Greenfield 
FDI 
Base case N/A Predicted mean 8,639.594 2,991.473 4,679.922 
Ease of doing 
business 
= 𝑋𝑖 + 0.1 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖
≤ 81 & 
= 𝑋𝑖  𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 > 81 
% change 16.22 74.29 0.29 
Predicted mean 10,041.23 5,213.674 4,693.462 
Payments = 𝑋𝑖 − 0.25 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 
% change 0.43 2.49 1.18 
Predicted mean 8,676.573 3,066.005 4,735.256 
Time = 𝑋𝑖 − 0.25 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 
% change -4.35 -4.87 -10.67 
Predicted mean 8,263.898 2,845.923 4,180.831 
Profit Tax 
= 𝑋𝑖 − 5, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 > 5 &
= 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 5 
% change 2.90 -7.44 -1.38 
Predicted mean 8,890.204 2,768.947 4,615.193 
Labor Tax & 
Contrib. 
= 𝑋𝑖 − 5, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 > 5 &
= 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 5 
% change -2.71 9.05 -11.90 
Predicted mean 8,405.569 3,262.143 4,123.136 
Other Taxes 
= 𝑋𝑖 − 5, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 > 5 &
= 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 5 
% change 0.02 0.31 -0.07 
Predicted mean 8,641.287 3,000.852 4,676.743 
Time to obtain 
VAT refund 
= 𝑋𝑖 − 0.25 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 
% change -17.69 -26.09 2.04 
Predicted mean 7,111.166 2,211.136 4,775.186 
Cases for CIT 
audit 
= 𝑋𝑖 − 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 > 0 &
= 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 = 0 
% change -21.80 -53.43 -2.62 
Predicted mean 6,755.876 1,393.051 4,557.138 
= 𝑋𝑖 + 1,  
𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑋𝑖 < 4 & 
= 4, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 = 4 
=0, 𝑋𝑖 = 0 
% change 19.55 47.91 2.35 
Predicted mean  10,328.440 4,424.541 4,790.003 
Time to comply 
with CIT audit 
= 𝑋𝑖 − 0.25 ∗ 𝑋𝑖, 
𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 > 0 & 
= 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖 = 0 
 
% change 0.69 3.28 2.77 
Predicted mean 8,699.13 3,089.644 4,809.377 
 
  The 25 percent reduction in time spent annually on preparation of tax documents reveals 
negative impact on FDIs. It could be assumed that foreign investors prefer not to be rushed 




taking longer time for tax preparation; therefore expectations from them to comply with tax 
obligations on a short-term notice would be met with objections. In addition, a new market entry 
is usually associated with the learning curve including regulatory standards, which, in turn, 
requires longer time for adjustment and submission of tax returns, especially if the regulations 
are complex, have limited capacity for providing common learning ground to foreign investors, 
less flexible tools for hiring necessary talent and, sometimes, due to the language barriers.  
 The direct relation of CIT reduction and both types of FDIs is mainly related to the fact 
that almost 70 percent of M&A transactions are conducted in the North America region, 
including two countries, the United States and Canada. In despite to Canada substantially 
reducing the CIT rate, from 24.8 percent in 2009 to 3.9 percent, the M&A for the country is 
reported with a negative sign in 2017. In addition, the CIT rate in the United States has been 
around 27-28 percent, which is much higher than the mean of 16 percent for the global scale 
analysis. Only a handful of countries report positive trend, including China (particularly Hong-
Kong), Israel, Mauritius, Singapore, India, and Russian Federation; among these countries China 
have increased the CIT rate from 5 to 10.8 percent, while the tax rate in India and Israel is higher 
than the mean (23-24 and 20-21 percent, respectively). At the same time the direct relation of 
CIT and types of FDI also captures the global declining trend in both M&A and greenfield 
investments, which, in part, may correspond with the notion of tax competition.  
 Finally, 5 percent reduction in labor tax and contribution rates causes discrepancy 
between M&A and greenfield investors, encouraging M&A and reducing greenfield investments, 




5.3 Policy implications 
The existing literature and public managers are largely in an agreement concerning the 
reverse effect between FDI inflows and tax rates, assuming that lower tax rates may create 
incentives for inbound FDIs flows. The literature also suggests that the reduction of tax rates is 
perceived more favorably by multinationals than the improvement in tax administration, 
estimating 10 percent improvement in tax complexity being similar to 1 percentage point 
reduction in taxes. Following this notion, public administrators of low-income countries consider 
offering high tax reductions in order to incentivize possible FDI inflows.  
Our analysis, which compares cross-border mergers and acquisitions and greenfield FDIs 
advocates a different standpoint. The analysis does not estimate significant impact of corporate 
income tax in relation to the types of FDI inflow and a hypothetical 5 percent CIT reduction 
impacts negatively both M&A and greenfield investments. On the one hand, in part, this 
outcome may relate to the widespread practice of FDI seeking countries to offer significant 
reductions in tax rates, which, due to the prevalent nature of using this tool, has become an 
expected part of the negotiations and lost its power as an incentive when pursuing foreign 
capital. On the other hand, the decisions on foreign investments might not focus on particular tax 
rates in potential host economies as long as the economies overall offer business friendly 
conditions, captured by ease of doing business indicator and having significant impact on all 
three studied cases of FDI inflow. Finally, the direct trend captures the macroeconomic 
environment with reported decline in both M&A and greenfield investments in 2017.   
The study also reveals somewhat contradictory perception of M&A and greenfield 
investors on reduction in labor tax and contributions effective rate. The analysis defines that an 




meantime, a hypothetical decrease by 5 percent leads to 9 percent increase in M&A. Overall, the 
nature of labor tax & contribution effective rate is somewhat different than a strict tax revenue 
mobilization mechanism, due to the built-in income redistribution tool in the form of employers’ 
retirement contributions, which the greenfield investors could use as a possible incentive when 
hiring the best talent in a host economy.  
The analysis also defines significant role of tax administration of host economies 
impacting decisions of multinationals, particularly the greenfield investors, to move forward with 
capital investments. In the meantime, the forecast related to approximately 20-25 percent 
improvement in various areas of tax administration reveals that both, M&As and greenfield 
investors, are very sensitive to rigorous tax reforms of tax administration nature in host 
economies, aimed at improving specific conditions necessary for conducting businesses. The 
analysis reveals that the multinationals favor thorough requirements for CIT audit, which would 
eliminate the risk of financial mistakes in long-term and reduce the time spent on completing 
CIT audit. 
The study results could particularly be useful for lower income economies when 
reevaluating the targeted channels of foreign capital. This study leads to the assumption that any 
economy can be successful in competition for foreign capital. The main objective is to clearly 
evaluate the resources of an economy, whether it would be better off when competing for M&A 
or greenfield investments and capacity that it could offer for the fair exchange. Taking into 
consideration that greenfield investments are focused on the improvement of country specific 
conditions for running business and paying taxes, the combination of domestic fiscal reforms and 
targeted marketing to relevant investors could potentially lead to new successful business 




6.  Conclusions 
   The analysis reveals that, in general, any country may compete for getting FDI; 
however, it is essential for fiscal policy managers to have a fair assessment of the scope of 
country specific advantages that would determine the type of targeted investments and help in 
designing relevant fiscal policy tools. On the one hand, in most cases, the inflow of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions is predetermined by higher income countries located in particular 
regions. On the other hand, the low-income countries with rigorous reforms aimed at 
improvement of tax regulations and administration standards are likely to attract greenfield 
investments. This result could particularly be useful for low-income economies which have not 
been actively explored by foreign investors, since greenfield investments are more focused on the 
country specific conditions for running business and paying taxes, therefore the combination of 
relevant reforms within the country and marketing it to greenfield investors could potentially 
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